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Abstract. The widespread adoption of autonomous systems depends
on providing guarantees of safety and functional correctness, at both de-
sign time and runtime. Information about the extent to which functional
requirements can be met in combination with non-functional require-
ments (NFRs)–i.e. requirements that can be partially complied with–,
under dynamic and uncertain environments, provides opportunities to
enhance the safety and functional correctness of systems at design time.
We present a technique to formally define system attributes that can
change or be changed to deal with dynamic and uncertain environments
(denominated weakened specifications) as a partially ordered lattice, and
to automatically explore the system under different specifications, using
probabilistic model checking, to find the likelihood of satisfying a re-
quirement. The resulting probabilities form boundaries of “optimal spec-
ifications”, analogous to Pareto frontiers in multi-objective optimization,
informing the designer about the system’s capabilities, such as resilience
or robustness, when changing its attributes to deal with dynamic and
uncertain environments. We illustrate the proposed technique through a
domestic robotic assistant example.
1 Introduction
Autonomous systems interact with complex uncertain and dynamic environ-
ments, which may affect their ability to meet functional and non-functional re-
quirements (NFRs). These systems should try to achieve their goals as best as
possible [27], regardless of the obstacles faced. Verification and validation (V&V)
processes (e.g. formal analysis methods or testing) can provide information on
functional correctness and system safety, which can be a cost-effective way to
demonstrate requirements conformance at design time.
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However, available system specification frameworks cannot express flexibility
in requirement compliance. It may be desirable for example, to trade a slight
“relaxation” in an NFR or some other measure of the system (its “attributes”)
for a dramatic improvement in the compliance of others. Understanding the re-
lationship between such requirements is a form of exploring the design space
of the system, in which the designer can assess the suitability of potential de-
signs. One example would be the design space for self-adaptive systems [5], which
enumerates the set of concerns that one must consider in an adaptive system,
but for which no specification or verification facility exists. Formal specification
languages such as temporal logics [3], timed input/output automata [12] or the
Z language [26] require an enumeration or explicit parametrization of all the
system behaviours and their contexts (e.g. [15,34]), which in turn requires deep
knowledge and a large modelling effort. More generic specification conventions
such as flow charts (e.g. UML) or specification documents [16,4] are more ex-
pressive in terms of “flexibility” to requirement compliance, but they lack formal
analysis support to verify the satisfaction of requirements.
The problem of specifying NFRs in autonomous systems can be thought of
as one of feasibility: we may demand that NFRs are fully conformed with, but
the likelihood of that happening in an uncertain and dynamic environment may
be low. A desirable design is one with a high level of NFR compliance, but that
also has a high probability of achieving its objectives. Therefore, we consider our
research questions to be:
RQ1. How do we specify a system that can operate in suboptimal circumstances,
allowing the system to partially (i.e. ”as well as possible”) comply with its
NFRs, and how do we systematically analyse such specifications at design
time?
RQ2. How can we assess the feasibility of a particular level of requirement confor-
mance, to allow comparison of designs in the design space?
To answer the first question, we propose the use of a partially ordered lattice
to define a finite set of specifications (from the system’s attributes) to choose
from in the design, weakened to increase the likelihood for the system to com-
ply with functional requirements when interacting with dynamic and uncertain
environments.
To answer the second question, we compute probabilities using the PRISM
probabilistic model checker [20], according to the different specifications, based
on functional requirements. We model the systems and their environments as
parametrized Markov decision processes (MDPs), to reflect the uncertainty and
dynamism of autonomous systems through non-determinism and stochasticity.
We then use PRISM to explore the model and determine the probability, accord-
ing to different specifications in the lattice, based on functional requirements.
Traversing the lattice of specifications to find where the probabilities of require-
ment satisfaction increase to a desired level signifies an exploration of the possi-
ble “relaxations” in the system’s specifications, to deal with their uncertain and
dynamic environments. Hence, our approach departs from others where design
analysis imply proving that the system’s assumptions are satisfied at all times,
and the functional or safety and non-functional requirements are complied with
always and forever.
The probabilities form a family of boundaries within the lattice elements ac-
cording to transitions from Pr < ρ to Pr ≥ ρ, where ρ is a threshold. These
boundaries correspond to the “optimal” specifications in terms of the trade-
off between high requirement compliance probability and desirable operation.
Hence, the resulting lattice answers quantitative questions such as “what are
the specifications under which a system has to operate to successfully complete
a task”. We propose a method for the exploration of systems at design time,
towards understanding the trade-off between requirement compliance and desir-
able operation. Our method provides means so gain confidence that autonomous
systems achieve their ultimate objective when working in dynamic, uncertain
environments [13].
We illustrate the use of our proposed specification technique and analysis
approach through the exploration of a domestic robotic assistant, which we
present alongside the theoretical aspects. Our results show that we can anal-
yse the behaviour of systems under dynamic, uncertain environments, gathering
information about their requirement compliance without having to leave V&V
to runtime monitoring and the consequent “failure recovery” mechanisms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a motivating case study of
a domestic robotic assistant, which is used to exemplify the proposal. Section 3
introduces the formalization to construct ordered system specifications. Section 4
describes the computation of probabilities according to different specifications,
based on functional requirements, through probabilistic model checking. In Sec-
tion 5, we analysed the specifications for our case study, which provided insights
on “optimal” and preferred specifications, based on degree and likelihood of re-
quirement compliance. We discuss the presented approach in Section 6. Section 7
presents an overview of related work on the specification and verification of sys-
tems that deal with uncertain environments at design time. We conclude the
paper in Section 8 and give an outlook on future work.
2 Motivating Case Study: A Domestic Robotic Assistant
We considered a domestic robotic assistant interacting with a person. This case
study is representative of the adoption of autonomous systems that interact
closely in the same spaces as people, and thus their behaviour needs to be verified
to ensure safety and functional correctness.
The robot operates in an open-plan, confined floor of a house, represented by
a grid. The robot is allowed to move in four directions, north, south, east or west
in the grid, with a maximum velocity limit, or it can choose to stay in the same
cell (e.g. to avoid collisions). A human that suffers of memory loss cohabits this
space. This erratic behaviour is represented as stochastic motion in the grid. A
representation of this setup is shown in Fig. 1.
The robot has a battery, and it will seek recharge at a station fixed in the grid,
when reaching a minimal energy threshold. The battery energy diminishes each
Fig. 1. A robotic assistant and a person, in an open-plan, confined floor as a grid
time the robot moves (one unit per motion cycle). The robot needs to coordinate
recharging, whilst servicing the person within a time threshold. Additionally, the
robot avoids colliding with the person for safety.
Due to the highly challenging human behaviour, the robot can choose to
change two of its attributes: the maximum velocity limits at which it can move,
and the maximum permitted servicing time. We would like to determine how
quickly the robot can service the human with a particular maximum velocity,
and what margin of energy reserves are required to complete this task.
3 Specifying Systems that Deal with Uncertain
Environments
Systems that are to be verified must have a defined set of requirements that
identify the correct behaviour of the system, which a verification technique can
then prove hold over the system. Often, a system’s requirements is augmented
with a set of NFRs, requirements that need not hold, but which are desirable
to hold. In cases where NFRs may be partially satisfied, it is desirable they
hold to the greatest extent possible. An example would be that a requirement
must be fulfilled in the minimum amount of time possible. Separately, a system
may also contain configurable attributes, such as operational limits e.g. mini-
mum/maximum bounds in battery charge. We assume these attributes and the
system state variables are continuous, as autonomous systems interact with the
real world.
Definition 1. The state space of a system is an element of Rn.
The n variables of a system, e.g. time, motion, communication protocols etc, can
be related to each other. Their evolution is described by the logics and dynamics,
e.g. an ordinary differential equation (ODE) about the system’s physics or a
logical description of the decision making process. Examples of system variables
in the case study are the location of the human and the robot in the grid, the
battery recharge state, and the elapsed time.
Definition 2. A system attribute is a function of the state variables, fm : Rn →
Bool, where m is the attribute identifier.
Each attribute constrains the state space to a subset of Rn, Sm ⊆ Rn, where
Sm = {x ∈ Rn : fm(x) = True}. Typically there is a set of attributes that,
when taken together, define the states in which a system operates. In the case
study, the attributes of the robot are the maximum velocity limits, pi = v ≤ i
with i = 1, . . . , 6, and the maximum allowed time cycles to service the human,
qj = t ≤ j with j = 1, . . . , 10.
Definition 3. Given a finite number of system attributes fm, a specification is
a function f : Rn → Bool such that f = ∧m fm.
Thus, a specification identifies the subset S ⊆ Rn where S = ⋂m Sm. For
the case study, this is formed by an assignment of maximum velocity limit and
maximum allowed time cycles to service the human, such as p2 = v ≤ 2 and
q4 = t ≤ 4.
We now consider a finite set of specifications, which can be partially ordered.
These will be used to analyse the system, to provide the system designer with
information about NFR compliance and requirement satisfaction, at design time.
Each specification for the robotic assistant has the form:
f = pi ∧ qj where i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} and j ∈ {1, . . . , 10} (1)
We also wish to be able to reason about whether a specification is “better” or
“worse” than another specification, in terms of NFR satisfaction. Therefore we
define a partial order representing the weakenings of a specification as follows.
Definition 4. Given two specifications f, f ′ with associated subsets S, S′ ⊆ Rn,
we say that f is a weakening of f ′, denoted f ≤ f ′, iff S ⊇ S′.
For the current example, we have that pi ∧ qj ≤ pi′ ∧ qj′ iff i > i′ ∧ j > j′.
In other words, considering the NFRs “velocity must stay as small as possible”
and “servicing time must be as fast as possible”, the strongest specification in
the case study would be p1 ∧ q1, and the weakest specification, i.e. the one with
the lowest level of compliance, would be p6∧q10. Ideally, the robot would service
p1 ∧ q1
p2 ∧ q1 p1 ∧ q2
p3 ∧ q1 p2 ∧ q2 p1 ∧ q3
p4 ∧ q1 p3 ∧ q2 p2 ∧ q3 p1 ∧ q4
p5 ∧ q1 p4 ∧ q2 p3 ∧ q3 p2 ∧ q4 p1 ∧ q5
p6 ∧ q1 p5 ∧ q2 p4 ∧ q3 p3 ∧ q4 p2 ∧ q5 p1 ∧ q6
Fig. 2. Segment of the partially ordered lattice for the domestic robotic assistant case
study
the human as fast as possible (in the least possible cycles), while moving at a
velocity that is not dangerous, at p1 ∧ q1. If this is not possible, we could settle
for a “suboptimal” option, e.g. the specification q5 ∧ p8. Further weakenings of
the specification p5 ∧ q8 are p5 ∧ q9, p5 ∧ q10, p6 ∧ q8, p6 ∧ q9, and p6 ∧ q10.
This allows the computation of a lattice using the two system attributes in
the case study, and the NFRs mentioned before. Fig. 2 shows only a segment
of the resulting 6 × 10 lattice, built starting from the most NFR compliant
specification (top).
Having formalised the system specifications to represent conformance in un-
certain and dynamic environments, and ordered with respect to NFR compliance,
we then proceed to explore the potential design space, to establish “how well”
a functional requirement can be met under these specifications. For all speci-
fications, given an unpredictable and dynamic environment, there are varying
probabilities of requirement satisfaction. For example, were one to place a low
limit on the speed of a robot, but also required it to complete tasks very quickly,
the probability of success would be low. This interaction between the system
attributes of a specification is hard to define, and may be dependent on the
environment in which the system operates.
Ideally, an oracle would determine the probability of the system meeting its
requirements, under a given specification. We could set a probability bound of
Pr ≥ ρ, which would separate the specifications into sets, where Pr < ρ and
Pr ≥ ρ, respectively, for all possible values of ρ. We use the PRISM model
checker to automatically compute these probabilities (i.e. as the oracle), accord-
ing to different specifications, based on functional requirements.
Considering the order in the lattice, the resulting boundaries in the specifi-
cations, where the probability transitions from Pr < ρ to Pr ≥ ρ, form a surface
analogous to a Pareto frontier in multi-objective optimization, representing the
“optimal” specifications in terms of meeting the probability threshold ρ at the
least weakened specification with respect to NFR compliance level. In other
words, the aim is to identify the maximal elements of the set of specifications
with Pr ≥ ρ.
The monotonicity of the system’s NFR compliance over the state variables
translates into monotonicity of the probabilities of requirement satisfaction, com-
puted for the specifications in the lattice. In the PRISM model, for any specifica-
tions f ≤ f ′, by Definition 4, it follows that the set of states and paths reachable
for f is a superset of those reachable for f ′.
The complexity to compute an entire lattice is dependent on the size of
specification set. Algorithms with time complexity of O(|X|+ |B| · |B| · |F|) have
been proposed before, where X and B are related to the size of a specification (in
number of variables and samples), and F is the number of nodes in the lattice,
formed by the conjunction or disjunction of the basis in B (see e.g. [22] for more
details and algorithms).
Although the lattice can be constructed in its entirety, a more effective ex-
ploration can be done by sampling only some of the nodes in the lattice, and
applying model checking to a system under this subset of specifications to check
where in the lattice the requirements are likely to be fulfilled. This would al-
low finding specific probability boundaries Pr ≤ ρ over the lattice in a fast
and approximate manner, rather than through exploring the lattice from the
top to the bottom. We could guide the sampling and exploration of the lattice
with methods used to compute approximated Pareto frontiers in multi-objective
optimization, e.g. with Gaussian process regression [35].
4 Systematic Analysis of System Behaviours with
Probabilistic Model Checking
In a V&V process we determine if a system complies with its requirements. In
classical model checking, a finite-state model of a system is explored exhaustively,
to determine if a temporal logic property is satisfied or not. PRISM targets sys-
tems that exhibit non-deterministic behaviour, modelled as discrete-time Markov
chains, continuous-time Markov chains, or Markov decision processes (MDPs),
among others. Probabilities of property satisfaction are computed by the tool.
The main drawback of model checking is the cost in computational time and
memory, due to the state space explosion problem. This problem is due to the
exponential growth in number of states to traverse, when adding variables [10].
So far, the computational demands of model checking have made it unsuitable
for runtime verification [6].
We start by modelling the system and its environment as a stochastic prob-
abilistic formal model, along with its environment. This model is used in the
PRISM probabilistic model checker, which supports verification of properties
given in various temporal logics and quantifying the probability of a particu-
lar property holding. The model is formed of three parts: the environment, the
system, and a property generated from each specification based on a functional
requirement.
The environment model is created as a discrete time Markov chain, where
its actors are specified using probabilistic behaviour to represent uncertainty
about their actions. All dynamic or uncertain behaviours must be encoded in
the environmental model, to allow opportunity for the model checker to explore
different outcomes based on those behaviours. The system model is not encoded
as a particular algorithm or controller implementation; instead all possible ac-
tions are encoded as non-deterministic choices. This allows the model checker to
pick which action the system is to take, in any particular circumstance. In effect,
the system model represents all possible actions that the system may choose from
to respond to its environment (e.g. controllers), allowing the model checker to
pick one that most appropriately satisfies the verification property (see below).
The combined environment and system models form a Markov decision process,
or MDP.
We constructed a parametrized model of the domestic robot setting described
in Section 2 (with a person as the stochastic environment), in the form of Markov
decision processes. This model contains 5 modules, corresponding to the human
and robot motion, the timing, the energy in the battery, and the servicing task.
The parametrization prunes the state space of the model to a particular specifi-
cation, which otherwise would comprise all possible specifications. We filter out
certain unrealistic activities on the part of the robot, such as attempting to leave
the grid environment and any action that would cause an immediate collision
with the human.
The temporal logic property specification language for MDPs is probabilistic
computation tree logic (PCTL) [20]. PRISM allows qualitative questions about
the probability (P) of properties (e.g. is is true that the probability of event
X is greater than 0.9?), and also quantitative questions, i.e. computing actual
probabilities (e.g., what is the maximum probability of event X, given some
initial conditions?). The primary operator is φ U ψ, “φ holds until ψ holds”,
which can be augmented with a time bound φ U<=t ψ specifying a maximum
period of time t in which ψ must become true. Most other operators can be
derived from the until operator, which is the only operator we us in this paper.
We produce a temporal logic property from the conjunction of a property
(from functional requirements) and each specification (constraints). Assuming
that a property is already specified in PCTL, we conjoin each state formula
with the specification’s constraints, producing another PCTL formula which ef-
fectively disallows any path from entering a state that violates the specification.
To resolve the non-determinism of the system model we replace the probability
quantification operator with the “Pmax” operator, specifying that the probabil-
ity should be quantified under the actions that lead to the maximum probability
of success. The same specification in the property is also embedded in a PRISM
“filter” statement to analyse all starting states and select the starting state with
the minimum probability of success. In summary, we compute the worst-case
probability of success of the system under a specification, assuming an optimal
system action is chosen from the modelled non-deterministic options.
An example of a property to verify, or a query about the model under a
particular specification is: “computing the minimum probability of completing
a servicing of the human in 5 time cycles (robot motion steps), considering a
specific instance of servicing time threshold bound, the maximum velocity for
the robot, the minimum energy threshold, and the starting energy”.
filter(min,Pmax =?[(serviceHuman) ∧ (velocity ≤ 4)
U≤20(¬serviceHuman) ∧ (velocity ≤ 4)],
((serviceHuman ∧ serviceT imer = 0) ∨ ¬serviceHuman)
∧(velocity ≤ 4) ∧ (minenergy = 2) ∧ (energy = 25)
∧(tick = 0) ∧ ((robotX 6= humanX) ∨ (robotY 6= humanY ))) (2)
The model checker computes a minimum probability to complete the ser-
vicing of the human, subjected to particular values of initial battery energy,
maximum velocity for the robot, and maximum allowed time cycles to service
the human. When the robot does not need to service the person, the model
checker chooses a velocity and direction for its motion, from the available op-
tions, including the specified velocity upper limit.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
The lattice was computed through a Python script. We ran the model checking
experiments on a PC with Intel i5-3230M 2.60 GHz CPU, 8 GB of RAM, Ubuntu
14.04, and PRISM 4.2.beta1. Model checking took less than 1 minute for each
experiment–i.e. each model checking run–, with a minimal time of 10 seconds.
All underlying data on the model and results are openly available online.4
The graphs in Fig. 3 show the probability of servicing the human, for different
specifications comprising maximum velocity and maximum servicing time. The
grid size is 7× 7 cells. The minimum threshold for battery recharging (min = 2
units), the initial locations of the human and the robot in the grid (at (5, 5) and
(4, 4), respectively), and the location of the recharge station (at (0, 0) or top left
corner), were left at specified fixed values. The initial battery energy charge was
varied for each graph, from the set {25, 20, 15, 10, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1} units, respectively.
The graphs show that the probabilities of satisfying the property (2) given
the different specifications for the maximum velocity, maximum servicing time
and available energy. The energy attributes are examined in greater detail when
the initial battery charge drops below 5 units (as shown in graphs (f) to (i) in
Fig. 3). We can observe that the robotic assistant will be unable to satisfy the
property for the ideal condition where the velocity is minimal (i.e. v ≤ 1) and the
servicing time is minimal too (i.e. t ≤ 1), as shown in all the graphs in Fig. 3.
Nonetheless, we could settle for thresholds of v ≤ 4 and t ≤ 4 (specification
p4 ∧ q4), v ≤ 3 and t ≤ 5 (specification p3 ∧ q5), or v ≤ 2 and t ≤ 6 (specification
p2∧q6), if the battery is initially charged at above 5 units. For safety reasons, as
the velocity is less, we would prefer p2 ∧ q6 over the other two options. Another
critical threshold would be to start with a battery charged at above 4 units, since
weakening the specifications to be p4 ∧ q4 or p3 ∧ q5 under this setting provides
an acceptable probability of success, as shown in graph (f) in Fig. 3.
4 https://removed-for-review
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Fig. 3. Probabilities for specifications in the case study, comprising the maximum
velocity limit for the robot and the maximum servicing time cycles, for different initial
battery energy charges
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Answering the Research Questions
The core contribution of our technique is providing an automated way to for-
malize the system specifications (through a partially ordered lattice), and to
illuminate the design process towards choosing specifications (i.e. instances of
system attributes) that satisfy their functional requirements to a high degree,
whilst complying the most with respect to their NFRs. The obtained informa-
tion about the system specifications illustrates the relations between the systems
attributes. Fig. 3 demonstrates these relations for our case study.
Other information that the analysis illustrated by Fig. 3 could provide is, for
example, the presence of a “cliff edge”. This would show that success is almost
guaranteed past a velocity limit, thus informing the designer about the little
value gained by the system ever exceeding that limit. Likewise, if the weakening
of a specification made requirement failure very likely (it does not “degrade
gracefully”) then a designer could take action to avoid those specifications.
Ultimately the information imparted by our technique is limited by the range
of options available to the designer: ideally the designer would be in a position to
assign any value to any system attribute. For example, in our case study finding
that a very large amount of starting energy was required to always complete a
task might provoke the selection of a more power efficient propulsion system.
On the other hand, the system designer has increased knowledge regarding how
different levels of NFR compliance trade, and can make appropriate decisions in
the design, according to how they prioritise different NFRs. Additionally, the in-
formation from the design exploration provides a set of “optimal” specifications,
analogous to Pareto frontiers, in terms of least weakened specifications that are
likely to satisfy functional requirements, whilst complying with NFRs as best as
possible.
The largely automated nature of our technique means that this information
is available to the designer without the need for her to analyse complex system
models herself. Moreover, because our probability valuations are for the worst
starting state (given that the best actions are chosen), the designer is guaranteed
that the reported valuation is achieved by the system regardless of circumstance,
ensuring no additional analysis is required.
Discovering and using the “best” system action in the model checking process
separates the concerns of which action is the best, and whether the whole design
of the system is sufficiently good. Without explicitly considering the matter of
strategy or controller synthesis, the designer is able to discover the fundamental
limitations on the performance of their system.
6.2 Limitations
While automating the exploration of a complex system to discover its limitations
is useful, it comes at the cost of having to first model the system. Although mod-
elling the system states might be straightforward, the selection of appropriate
probabilities with which to model the behaviour of the environment may not be
that simple, because this is likely to require either evidence or domain knowledge.
The accuracy of the resulting probability (from the model checking process) for
each specification in the lattice is underpinned by the environmental model, and
any inaccuracy there will reduce the accuracy of the calculations.
Using a model checker for formal analysis purposes can lead to the state
explosion problem: increasing the complexity of a system model leads to an
exponentially increasing number of states to be checked. Hence, model checking
does not scale gracefully. However, we see this as a realisation of the inherent
complexity in the problem we are trying to solve, in that complex systems are
difficult for humans to reason about too. Ultimately, the matter is a cost/benefit
relation: does the benefit of modelling a particular system and the increased
knowledge imparted justify the cost of checking very large models of it?
The model checking process selects the lowest probability of success from
the set of all starting states, when calculating the probability for a particular
specification. This provides the designer with a guarantee that the obtained
probability can be met, at the cost of a result that is not representative of
all the systems’ starting states. Potentially, a poor performance for a single
starting state may be acceptable to the designer, or might lead to design changes
that eliminate that starting state, but our technique does not reveal this. One
workaround for this matter would be to average the success probability over all
starting states (a feature supported by PRISM) and assess specifications in the
lattice considering both the minimum and the average probabilities.
7 RELATED WORK
Much of the work on the specification and verification of systems that deal with
uncertain environments is based in the adaptive systems domain. The verifi-
cation of adaptive systems has been performed with techniques such as formal
modelling [32,29], stochastic evaluation [23] and testing [7]. These techniques are
typically applied to a particular implementation of the system’s controller, and
seek to verify functional properties of the system rather than evaluate the design
space of possible controllers. Fleurey et al. [14] present a domain specific mod-
elling language to describe the potential adaptations of a system, and constraints
to limit their context, to synthesize a requirement compliant adaptation policy.
Their technique can be used to optimise policies for best NFR compliance, but
in comparison to ours, it does not fully model the environment in which the
system operates. Their approach maximises NFR compliance for given “tests”
(i.e. defined environment instances), rather than guaranteeing a level of service
for different possible environments.
Several techniques have been proposed for specifying the correct behaviour of
adaptive systems with configurable parameters, analogous to our design space
exploration but specifying the desirability of a configuration rather than the
probability of success given a system model [8]. Of these, RELAX [31] pro-
vides a configuration specification language with fuzzy logic semantics, while
FORMS [30] provides a reference model for describing the correct operation of
adaptive systems.
Elsewhere, requirements engineering seeks to formulate theory and technique
behind the specification of requirements that correctly reflect a system’s be-
haviour, for example with adaptation [17]. Fuzzy logic and risk analysis mod-
els can be used to formulate the system’s requirements when uncertainty is
present due to adaptation [24,33]. Qualitative requirements or soft-goals, sim-
ilar to NFRs, can also be modelled through fuzzy logic [25]. In contrast, [9]
argues that the requirements should be formulated as “hard” constraints (i.e.
must always be fulfilled) but contextualized (e.g., tolerances for the requirements
according to the environment), instead of fuzzy. While these techniques define
a design space, they are rarely accompanied by formal analysis and systematic
design exploration methods.
Other research on requirements engineering has focused on extracting the
requirements that are satisfied by a system. Constraints can be removed system-
atically, to provide new requirements that can be satisfied by a system, as it is
done for linear temporal logic properties in [18].
As well as design-time verification, adaptive systems can be subject to run-
time verification, where they are monitored to see if they satisfy requirements
or to trigger new adaptations otherwise. High level requirements [8], Hidden
Markov Model estimation of property satisfaction [2], and process algebra [1]
have been used. Some authors propose the use of formal methods at runtime to
trigger adaptation to satisfy a requirement. Calinescu et al. [6] use online model
checking to evaluate the likelihood of requirement satisfaction given a decision,
while [21] examines a future horizon through a model checker to determine the
optimal adaptation. While we focus on design space exploration rather than on-
line verification, it is conceivable that information gained through the design
process can be used to formulate better runtime strategies.
Another application of formal methods for design optimisation is synthe-
sis of controllers or strategies. For example, the best strategies or models of a
system that satisfy a property are computed in [11]. Strategies that violate a
property the least are computed in [28], from weighted automata and reward
assignment. These synthesis processes do not necessarily entail adaptation (as
observed in [19]), as the systems to control normally are not allowed to modify
their operational spaces, nor is the environment allowed to change dynamically,
or non-deterministically.
Ehlers et al. [13] use controller synthesis to search for a level of controller
resilience to “glitches”, temporary violations of system assumptions. Their search
for an optimal system controller is similar to our system’s non-determinism,
and their Pareto frontier of number-of-glitches versus recovery-time represents
our lattice to an extent. However, their exploration is limited to only two (the
aforementioned) dimensions, is not probabilistic, and does not consider partial
satisfaction of requirements (NFRs).
8 CONCLUSIONS
We presented a technique to construct and automatically explore a specification
for systems that deal with uncertain environments, for design exploration and
formal analysis purposes. This technique constructs sections of a lattice of sys-
tem specifications, partially ordered by NFR compliance. The lattice allows the
designer to understand the trade-offs between the selection of different system
attributes, in terms of increasing or decreasing functional and non-functional
requirement compliance.
We illustrated the proposed technique through a domestic robotic assistant
case study. A partially ordered lattice was computed for all the attributes,
as the number of specifications was small. Subsequently, we implemented a
parametrized non-deterministic model of a robotic assistant and its home en-
vironment (including people), based on Markov decision processes (MDP) in
PRISM, a probabilistic model checker. This model encodes the world in which
the robot interacts and all of its possible control policies, as well as parametrized
attributes and system variables, such as minimum battery reserves and maxi-
mum speed limits. The environment is dynamic and behaves probabilistically.
The model checker automatically computes the (minimum) probability of the
system to satisfy a functional requirement (expressed as a temporal logic prop-
erty) under a specification from the lattice. Systematically exploring the lattice of
specifications allowed comparing the probabilities of task success/failure, to dis-
criminate between specifications that are suitable for the final system implemen-
tation, in a manner analogous to computing Pareto frontiers in multi-objective
optimization.
Whereas for small case studies the whole lattice can be computed and ex-
plored and even visualized, partial segments of interest of a full lattice can be
used instead for the analysis of real-life complex systems. In the near future, we
will be applying this premise to a real autonomous system, for exploration and
verification at design time. Additionally, we will research the application of our
technique to runtime verification of adaptive systems.
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